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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CELIA ANDERSON, 
Appellant, 
Case No. 870421 
vs. 
Case Priority No. 14(b) 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC AND 
RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGEONS, and 
DR. ROBERT GOLDWYN, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC AND 
RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGEONS AND DR. ROBERT GOLDWYN 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE LEONARD H. RUSSON, DISTRICT JUDGE 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether this Court may assume the correctness of the 
judgment below, where, as here, Anderson failed to factually 
support her contentions on appeal with citations to the Record? 
II. Whether the lower court properly dismissed appellant 
Celia Anderson's ("Anderson") claims against respondents 
American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc. 
("ASPRS") and Robert M. Goldwyn, M.D. ("Dr. Goldwyn") for lack 
of i_n personam jurisdiction because: 
A. ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn do not have sufficient 
minimum contacts with the State of Utah to satisfy the Utah 
Long-arm Statute; and 
B. Assertion of In Personam jurisdiction over ASPRS 
and Dr. Goldwyn would violate the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The statutory provisions relevant to a determinative 
resolution of the present case are (1) Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-24 (1987); (2) Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5 (1987); and (3) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises out of an action to recover damages for 
personal injuries allegedly suffered as a result of Celia 
Anderson's voluntary participation in a Silicone Injection 
Study, involving the use of MDX 4-4011, a sterile injectable 
silicone fluid for soft tissue augmentation. 
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Course of Proceedings Below 
On September 25, 1987, the district court granted respon-
dents' Motions to Quash Service of Process and to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Complaint because respondents ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn 
(1) "did not have sufficient contact with the State of Utah or 
plaintiff sufficient to satisfy the minimum contact requirement 
for assertion of IJI personam jurisdiction. . . ;" and (2) "To 
assert jin personam jurisdiction over [respondents] under the 
circumstances of this case would constitute a violation of 
constitutional due process." (Record at 1733, 1739-41, 1750.) 
See Order of Dismissal, attached hereto as Addendum "A." 
On October 22, 1987, Celia Anderson filed notice of appeal, 
seeking review of the lower court's Order of Dismissal. 
(Record at 1747. ) 
Statement of the Facts 
A. Jurisdictional Facts Relative to Dr. Goldwyn. 
Dr. Goldwyn is a medical doctor, specializing in plastic 
and reconstructive surgery and is licensed to practice medicine 
in the State of Massachusetts. (Record at 1466 and Affidavit 
of Dr. Goldwyn ("Goldwyn Affidavit") at 1f 2, attached hereto as 
Addendum "B.") 
Dr. Goldwyn acts as medical monitor for a Silicone 
Injection Study. (Record at 1810 and Deposition of Robert M. 
Goldwyn, M.D. ("Goldwyn Depo.") at 5:5-10.) 
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Dr. Goldwyn's role as medical monitor for the Silicone 
Injection Study is limited to screening potential patients' 
medical information to determine from such information whether 
the patients comport with FDA guidelines for acceptance into 
the Study. (Record at 1466-67, 1810; Goldwyn Depo. at 5:11-22, 
30-33; and Goldwyn Affidavit at 1f 6-7.) 
Based on medical information sent from Anderson's physician 
to Dr. Goldwyn in Massachusetts, Dr. Goldwyn gave approval for 
Anderson's voluntary entry into the Silicone Injection Study. 
(Record at 1466-67, 1810; Goldwyn Depo. at 39-40 and Goldwyn 
Affidavit at 1f1f 6-7. ) 
Dr. Goldwyn was not Anderson's physician and did not pro-
vide her any medical treatment or service. Dr. Goldwyn's role 
in plaintiff's entry in the Silicone Injection Study was 
strictly limited to review of medical information unilaterally 
provided by plaintiff's physician. (Record at 1467 and Goldwyn 
Affidavit at 1f 7. ) 
Dr. Goldwyn's review of Anderson's medical information was 
conducted in Massachusetts and Dr. Goldwyn has never seen or 
communicated with Anderson. Anderson never heard of Dr. 
Goldwyn until after this action was filed. (Record at 1624.) 
Anderson litigated this case against "a person she had never 
heard of." Id. 
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Dr. Goldwyn is a resident of Brookline, Massachusetts. 
(Record at 1466 and Goldwyn Affidavit at 1f 1. ) He has never 
been licensed to practice medicine in Utah. He has never 
advertised, maintained an office or otherwise transacted any 
business or practiced any medicine in the State of Utah. 
Dr. Goldwyn does not own, use or possess any real property 
situated in Utah. (Record at 1466 and Goldwyn Affidavit at 
ir 5.) 
Dr. Goldwyn is not employed as a medical doctor for the 
American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons. 
(Record at 1466 and Goldwyn Affidavit at 1f 3.) 
Dr. Goldwyn is not a medical doctor, agent, employee or 
representative of or for the Dow Corning Corporation ("Dow"). 
Id. at ir 4. 
Dr. Goldwyn has not played any part in the development and 
use of MDX4-4011 injectable silicone, except for performing the 
limited function of approving patients' voluntary enrollment in 
the Study according to FDA guidelines. (Record at 1810 and 
Goldwyn Depo. at p. 5:11-18.) 
Dr. Goldwyn's contacts, if any, with Utah and Anderson 
arise out of the unilateral act of Anderson's physician, who 
forwarded medical information to Dr. Goldwyn in Massachusetts. 
Dr. Goldwyn also engaged in limited correspondence to 
Anderson's physician. (Record at 1466-67 and Goldwyn Affidavit 
at 1F1f 3-7.) 
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B. Jurisdictional Facts Relative to ASPRS: 
ASPRS is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, exempt 
from federal income taxation pursuant to Section 501(c)(6) of 
the Internal Revenue Code (Record at 1444 and Affidavit of 
Thomas R. Schedler,("Schedler Affidavit") at 1f 2, attached 
hereto as Addendum "C") 
ASPRS is not qualified to do business in Utah, has no 
office or employee in Utah and has no agent for acceptance of 
service of process in Utah. (Record at 1444 and Schedler 
Affidavit at 11 3.) 
ASPRS has not contracted to supply services or goods in the 
State of Utah, has no telephone listing in Utah, has no bank 
account in Utah, and does not own, use or possess any real 
estate situated in Utah. Id. 
ASPRS does not and cannot practice medicine in Utah or in 
any state. (Record at 1444 and Schedler Affidavit at 1f 4.) 
ASPRS does not manufacture, sell or distribute MDX4-4011 or 
any drug or device in the State of Utah or any state and did 
not draft or distribute the consent form for participation in 
the MDX 4-4011 Silicone Injection Study. Id. 
For at least the past 10 years, ASPRS has not conducted any 
educational symposia or seminars in Utah. (Record at 1445 and 
Schedler Affidavit at 1f 9. ) 
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ASPRS is a voluntary membership association of 
approximately 2,600 plastic surgeons practicing in the United 
States and Canada; approximately 30 active members reside in 
Utah. (Record at 1444-45 and Schedler Affidavit at 1f1f 5-7.) 
The ASPRS membership meets once a year. The ASPRS annual 
meeting has never been held in the State of Utah. Id. 
ASPRS is governed by a twenty-one member Board of 
Directors, none of whom reside in Utah. (Record at 1446 and 
Schedler Affidavit at 1f 14.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The correctness of the lower court's decision to quash 
service of process and dismiss Anderson's claims against 
Dr. Goldwyn and ASPRS for lack of in personam jurisdiction 
should be assumed correct because Anderson failed to support 
her factual contentions on appeal with any specific citations 
to the record. Indeed, the few citations to the record upon 
which Andersen purports to rely are extrapolation or mischar-
acterization. 
The Utah forum has no in personam jurisdiction over 
Dr. Goldwyn and ASPRS because: (1) respondents have not 
engaged in any of the activities enumerated by the Utah 
Long-arm Statute; and (2) respondents do not have any meaning-
ful minimum contacts or relationships with the State of Utah or 
Anderson. Any contacts that may exist between respondents and 
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this forum are too random and attenuated to constitutionally 
support assertion of in personam jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF 
THE JUDGMENT BELOW BECAUSE ANDERSON FAILED 
TO REFER TO THE RECORD TO FACTUALLY SUPPORT 
HER CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL. 
This Court has consistently held that it will assume the 
correctness of the judgment below, where, as here, an appellant 
does not properly support facts set forth in her brief with 
citations to the Record. Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 
(Utah 1987) and State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 
1982). In Trees, this Court declared that it: 
will assume the correctness of the judgment below 
where counsel on appeal does not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, as to making a concise statement of 
facts and citations of the pages in the record where 
they are supported. (Citations omitted).1 
In Trees, the fact statement in the appellant's Brief referred 
to documents by their exhibit numbers, but contained no cita-
tions to the Record. Occasional references to the record 
l-Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, which became 
effective in April 1987, ultimately replaced former Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 75(p)(2)(2)(d), but did not alter the 
requirement that citations to the record to support the fact 
statement in the Briefs. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613, n.3. 
appeared in the Argument section of the Brief. Trees, 738 P.2d 
at 612, n.2. 
Similarly, in State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 
1982), this Court concluded that: 
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of 
the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer 
to any portion of the record that factually supports 
his contention on appeal. 
In the instant case, despite references to exhibits and 
affidavits contained in the Record, Anderson makes only occa-
sional extrapolated references to the Record to support her 
factual contentions. In many instances, as set forth in detail 
below, there is no reference to any source other than 
Anderson's own opinion or mere allegation. Accordingly, this 
Court should assume the correctness of the judgment below and 
may affirm the lower court's judgment on this independent basis. 
POINT II 
UTAH COURTS LACK IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION 
OVER DR. GOLDWYN AND ASPRS. 
The outermost reaches of amenability to in personam 
jurisdiction are governed by the law of the forum state, as 
limited under the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. Mallory 
Engineering, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Assoc, 618 P.2d 1004, 1008 
(Ut*h 1980). See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 (1987). 
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Utah law, as limited by due process only allows assertion 
of in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant when 
two conditions are satisfied: First, a defendant, through 
significant minimum contacts with the forum, must purposefully 
avail himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the 
forum. Abbott GM Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 
P.2d 850, 854 (Utah 1978). Second, such minimum contacts must 
not only satisfy statutory requirements, but also must make the 
exercise of jurisdiction comport with constitutional and 
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); 
and Burt Drilling, Inc., v. Porta Drill, 608 P.2d 244, 247 
(1980). 
The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that a 
defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of Utah courts. See 
Union Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d 1257, 1259 
(Utah 1976); and Segil v. Gloria Marshall Mqt. Co., 568 F. 
Supp. 915, 917 (D. Utah 1983). With respect to jurisdictional 
determinations, this Court cautioned that: 
plaintiff must show that his claim arises out of some 
contact defendant has with the forum state, some 
action undertaken by defendant by which it can be 
shown that defendant has "purposefully availed himself 
of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum state." 
Roskelly & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1311 (Utah 1980), 
quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Once a 
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jurisdictional determination has been made, this Court will 
presume its correctness: 
we [The Utah Supreme Court] indulge the presumption of 
verity and correctness of the trial court's deter-
mination and do not disturb it unless the plaintiff 
has shown that it was in error. 
Union Ski Co., 548 P.2d at 1259. See also Cate Rental Co. v. 
Wahlen & Co., 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976). 
In summary, in order to satisfy Anderson's evidentiary 
burden, she must have demonstrated, by competent evidence, that 
not only the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-24 
have been met, but also that the quality and nature of respon-
dents' activities are such that it is reasonable and fair to 
require them to conduct their defense in this state. Mallory 
Engineering, Inc. v. Brown, 618 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Utah 1980). 
Having failed to satisfy this evidentiary burden in the trial 
court, this Court will presume the correctness of the lower 
court's Ruling that Utah has no jurisdiction over respondents. 
Anderson cannot rest on mere allegations to establish error 
in the lower court. In Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 
(Utah 1983), this Court held that "mere assertions without 
proper evidentiary foundation" are insufficient to preclude 
granting of a dispositive motion. Likewise, in Thornock v. 
Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979), this Court stated that a 
plaintiff must "set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial." 
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In the instant case, Anderson failed to make any such 
evidentiary showing. Indeed, the essentially undisputed 
evidence demonstrates that ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn have not 
purposefully availed themselves of the privileges of conducting 
any activities in Utah. (Record at 1444-46 and 1466-67.) 
Moreover, the evidence is clear that the quality and nature of 
respondents' activities within this state, if any, fail to 
satisfy constitutional "notions of fair play and substantial 
justice" for assertion of in personam jurisdiction in Utah. 
A. ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn Are Not Subject to In Personam 
Jurisdiction Under the Utah Long-Arm Statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (1987) sets forth seven classes 
of activity (minimum contacts) which may render a nonresident 
subject to the jurisdiction of Utah courts under the Statute. 
Section 78-27-24 provides as follows: 
Any person . . . who in person or through em 
agent does any of the following enumerated acts, 
submits himself . . . to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within the 
state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in 
this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any 
real estate situated in this area. . . . 
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Subparts (5), (6) and (7) of Section 78-27-24, relating to 
insurance, divorce and paternity actions, respectively, are not 
included as they clearly have no application in the instant 
appeal. As will be demonstrated, subparts (1) through (4) of 
Utah's Long-arm Statute are likewise inapplicable. 
To establish statutorily required minimum contacts, "the 
defendant's conduct in connection with the forum state [must 
be] such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court there." World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 297 (1980). The Supreme Court's reasoning in Hanson v. 
Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), explains when a defendant 
should not anticipate out of state litigation: 
The unilateral activity of those who claim some 
relationship with a non-resident defendant cannot 
satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum 
state. The application of that rule will vary with 
the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, 
but it is essential in each case that there be some 
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself 
of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws. (Emphasis added.) 
Assertion of jurisdiction is not proper unless "the 
contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant 
himself that create a substantial connection with the forum 
state." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), 
(quoting McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 
220, 223 (1957)) (Emphasis in original). Thus, to support a 
-13-
determination of in personam jurisdiction a defendant's 
contacts must not be "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated." 
Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. at 253. 
In the instant case, there is no evidence that ASPRS or 
Dr. Goldwyn have transacted any business within the State of 
Utah (Subpart 1). (Record at 1444-46 and 1466-67.) Similarly, 
there is no evidence that respondents "contracted" to supply 
services or goods in the State of Utah (Subpart 2), or in any 
way purposefully availed themselves of the privileges and 
protections of conducting activities in this state. _Id. It is 
undisputed that respondents do not own, use or possess any real 
estate situated in the State of Utah (Subpart 4). Although 
Anderson alleges that ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn caused injury 
within this state, (Subpart 3), Anderson offers no specific 
evidence to support her allegation. 
B. Dr. Goldwyn Does Not Have Sufficient Minimum Contacts 
With The State Of Utah To Be Subject To In Personam 
Jurisdiction. 
1. There is no meaningful relationship between Dr. 
Goldwyn, the Utah forum and the instant 
litigation. 
In Mallory Engineering, Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Assoc, 618 
P.2d 1004 (Utah 1980), this court noted that: 
[t]he central concern of this inquiry into personal 
jurisdiction is the relationship of the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation, to each other. 
Mallory, 618 P.2d at 1007. See also Kulko v. Superior Court of 
California, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). 
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Q. Why is it a little strong? 
A. Because "conclude" implies a finality, and I 
always felt that, not examining a patient, I cannot 
make such a diagnosis, although it fit all the 
criteria of our study. 
(Record at 1810,) Therefore, Dr. Goldwyn never diagnosed 
Anderson, but merely reviewed medical information in 
Massacnusetts. Moreover, Anderson admits she never heard of 
Dr. Goldwyn prior to this litigation. (Record at 1124.) Under 
these circumstances Anderson's unsupported contention that 
"Goldwyn has had an ongoing interstate obligation and 
relationship with her for over ten years" is at best 
contradictory. 
Finally, a detailed review of correspondence between 
Anderson's physician, Dr. Woolf and Dr. Goldwyn confirms that 
Dr. Goldwyn was only remotely informed as to Anderson's alleged 
medical complications. (Record at 1632, 1636, 1641, 1645 and 
1650.) The correspondence does not contain advice, diagnosis 
or evidence of any treatment performed by Dr. Goldwyn because 
he was never Anderson's physician. The record simply reflects 
monitoring functions which were performed only in Massachusetts. 
2. Dr. Goldwyn does not have sufficient contacts 
with Utah to satisfy jurisdictional requirements 
under Utah law. 
Under circumstances where defendants have established more 
substantial contacts in Utah than Dr. Goldwyn, this Court has 
concluded that the Utah forum had no in personam jurisdiction. 
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In the instant case, Dr. Goldwyn's only alleged jurisdic-
tional contacts with Utah and Anderson arise out of: (1) 
review of Anderson's medical history in Massachusetts; (2) 
approval of Anderson's unilateral and voluntary application for 
entry in the Study, which approval was given in Massachusetts; 
(3) participation in drafting a consent form outside of Utah; 
(4) responsibility for a training program conducted in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan; and (5) limited monitoring related correspon-
dence to Anderson's physician. 
Anderson's contention that Goldwyn "knew . . . he would be 
approving silicone injection . . . in Utah is completely 
unsupported. Indeed, Dow Corning assumed the responsibility of 
organizing content and offering a basic format for the consent 
form, not Dr. Goldwyn. (Record at 1677.) Moreover there is no 
evidence to support the mere allegation that Dr. Goldwyn 
introduced the consent form in Utah. Under these facts, it 
cannot be said that Dr. Goldwyn "purposefully established 
'minimum contacts' in the forum state," which is "the constitu-
tional touchstone" of this determination. Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzawiez, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985), cpaoting International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The essentially 
undisputed evidence demonstrates, at most, only unintentional 
contact with Utah, insufficient to establish necessary minimum 
contacts in Utah. See Abbott, 578 P.2d at 854. 
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introducing of a consent form in Utah, and the consent form was 
not the source of injury to Anderson. 
Accordingly, Anderson's cited authorities are not appli-
cable here. For example, in Jones Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlas 
Service Corporation, 442 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1971), the Court 
held that assertion of jurisdiction was proper because the 
out-of-state defendant purposefully introduced a defective 
design in the forum state which caused a building to collapse. 
Similarly, the jurisdictional contact in Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), arose out of the purpose-
ful introduction of a libelous magazine into the forum state. 
Finally, the jurisdictional contact in Burt v. Board of Regents 
of the University of Nebraska, 757 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1985), 
was a libelous letter purposefully sent into Colorado. 
In each case cited by plaintiff, the jurisdictional contact 
relied upon was some material that was (1) purposefully sent 
into the foreign jurisdiction and (2) the direct source of 
injury there. Here, there is absolutely no factual support for 
the allegation that Dr. Goldwyn introduced the consent form 
into Utah or that the consent form was the Anderson's source of 
injury. Indeed, Anderson alleges that it was the injection of 
silicone that resulted in her alleged injury. (Anderson's 
brief at p. 7.) 
If Anderson's contention that mere assistance in drafting a 
consent form is sufficient to satisfy jurisdictional 
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consent. Thus, the issues of informed consent and participati 
in drafting a defective consent form are irrelevant. 
4. Dr. Goldwyn did not render medical diagnosis or 
treatment for Anderson. 
Plaintiff's cause of action against Dr. Goldwyn arises out 
of limited monitoring activities which occurred only in 
Massachusetts and bore no relationship to Utah. In 
interpreting the breadth and scope of the due process clause i 
similar cases regarding assertion of in personam jurisdiction 
over physicians, several courts have held that a patient may 
not consider an alleged tort to be committed wherever the 
consequences foreseeably may be felt. Wright v. Yackley, 459 
F.2d 287, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1972). 
In Wright, the court held that the fact that a doctor was 
on notice that the consequences of his South Dakota services 
would be felt in Idaho was not sufficient to make the doctor 
amenable to suit in Idaho under that State's Long-arm Statute. 
The opinion states as follows: 
In the case of personal services, focus must be on the 
place where the services are rendered, since this is 
the place of the receivers (here the patient's 
need). . . . [T]he idea that tortuous rendition of 
such services is a portable tort which can be deemed 
to have been committed wherever the consequences 
foreseeably were felt is wholly inconsistent with the 
public interest in having services of this sort 
generally available. 
459 F.2d at 289-90. 
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2See Lemke v. St. Margaret Hospital, 552 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. 
111. 1982 (an Indiana doctor who treated an Illinois patient 
was not subject to long arm jurisdiction in Illinois solely 
because his care in Indiana allegedly produced tortious injury 
in Illinois); Kennedy v. Zeismann, 526 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Ky. 
1983 ) (an Ohio doctor who treated Kentucky patient in Ohio and 
who maintained a telephone listing in Kentucky, but who did not 
otherwise advertise or solicit in Kentucky, was not subject to 
jurisdiction of a Kentucky court in a malpractice suit); Cook 
v. Searie, 475 F, Supp. 1166 (S.D. Iowa 1979) (Colorado doctors 
who prescribed plaintiff's use of a contraceptive device while 
plaintiff was a student in Colorado, were not subject to suit 
i n Iowa where plaintiff resided when the injury allegedly 
occurred); Glover v. Wagner, 462 F. Supp. 308 (D. Neb. 1978) 
(where doctor's administration of chemotherapy was localized 
and confined to Iowa, there were insufficient contacts with 
Nebraska for the application of Nebraska's long-arm statute 
notwithstanding the foreseeability of alleged effects occurring 
in Nebraska); Kailieha v. Hayes, 536 P.2d 568 (Hawaii 1975) (a 
Virginia physician who prescribed medication for a visiting 
Hawaii resident was not subject to long-arm, jurisdiction in 
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plaintiff.) 
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Because Anderson sought monitoring ervices abroad, she may not 
consider a tort to be committed wherever the consequences 
foreseeably were felt. Anderson's medical information was 
unilaterally forwarded to Dr. Goldwyn in Massachusetts. Thus, 
for all intents and purposes, any act of Dr. Goldwyn took place 
only in Massachusetts and bore no relation to Utah. 
Nevertheless, Anderson contends that assertion of 
jurisdiction over a doctor is appropriate if the doctor 
diagnoses a patient via telephone or by mail, while the patient 
is in his or her own state of residence. Again, plaintiff's 
supporting case authorities are inapplicable to the instant 
case because Dr. Goldwyn did not diagnose or treat Anderson. 
(Record at 1467 and Goldwyn Affidavit at 1f1f 6-7.) 
In McGhee v. Riekhof, 442 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Utah 1978), 
cited by Anderson, the ophthalmologist over whom the Montana 
court assumed jurisdiction had actually treated the 
patient/plaintiff in Utah, had maintained weekly telephone 
contact with the plaintiff, and had given medical advice 
concerning plaintiff's return to work which was the direct 
cause of injury to the plaintiff in Montana. Similarly, in 
S.R. v. City of Fairmont, 280 S.E.2d 712 (W. Va. 1981), cited 
by Anderson, the defendant medical corporation actually 
provided medical care for the patient/plaintiff and later 
failed to provide follow-up care in West Virginia where the 
defendant corporation derived direct economic benefits from 
business solicitations. 
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silicone. It is undisputed that none of these advisory 
activities occurred in Utah. IdL More importantly, none of 
these activities form a basis for jurisdiction over ASPRS in 
Utah. 
2. No jurisdiction arises from allegations regarding 
ASPRS' participation in drafting the consent form. 
Anderson alleged that ASPRS drafted a defective consent 
form which Anderson read in Utah, causing her to agree to 
treatment which injured her. Nevertheless, ASPRS established, 
through its Executive Director that it did not draft the 
consent form: "ASPRS . . . did not draft, prepare or 
distribute the consent form in issue". (Record at 1444 and 
Schedler Affidavit at 1f 4.) Because this purported juris-
dictional fact was properly challenged, Anderson continued to 
have the burden to come forward with proof of this juris-
dictional fact by affidavit or otherwise. Union Ski Co., 548 
P.2d at 1259. See also Dicesare-Engler Productions, Inc. v. 
Mainman Ltd., 81 F.R.D. 703 (W.D. Pa. 1979); and Buckeye 
Associates, Ltd. v. Fila Sports, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1484 (D.C. 
Mass. 1985). 
In response to this denial, Anderson submitted the 
deposition of Arthur Rathjen, Director of the Dow Corning 
Service to Medical Research, and specifically referred the 
Court to Page 102 of his Deposition. The specific testimony 
referred to reads as follows: "the ASPRS looked into the 
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interrogatories whien were signed by Rathjen of IJA Corning. 
Q. Identify the authors of r.ne consent form which 
was a"P°qedlv siqned Kv y • - -+- — * 
A. The consent form was drat tec by Arthur Rathjen, 
Director of Dow Corning Service to Medical 
Research, Harvey Steinberg, FDA Counsel, and 
Robert GcJcwyn, tht Medical Monitor. 
(Record at ±81^ an-: F a"- ~ ^  ~:' Der o r:t i on at yi • I l:i : . 
Rati Ljen was then as^ec wnotner t;:.s answer vai; : t : . > -.ccuia 
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folIcws' 
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. uat it (the consent form) was prepared by Dr. 
Goldwyn and our legal counsel, and the drafting of the 
inform(ed) patienr consent, when it was received, from 
Di. Goldwyn and the legal department, that I had it 
typed up did not prepare and I did not write the 
informed patient consent. 
Id. 
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Additionally, Exhibits attached to Anderson's own 
Memorandum In Opposition to the ASPRS' Motion to Dismiss, 
contradict involvement by the ASPRS with the consent form. 
Exhibit B of plaintiff's brief contains the Dow Corning minutes 
of April 11, 1977. Paragraph E(l) of this Exhibit reads as 
follows: 
E. Subject of Patient Consent Form. 
1. Dow Corning will assume responsibility of 
organizing content and offering a basic format. 
(Record at 1677. ) 
In summary, ASPRS did not draft the consent form; and 
Responses to Anderson's Interrogatories, signed by Dow Corning 
confirm this fact. Finally Anderson's own Exhibits advance 
ASPRS's argument that it was not involved with drafting the 
consent form. In response, Anderson merely extrapolates 
portions of the deposition testimony of Arthur Rathjen and asks 
this Court to infer involvement by the ASPRS. Under these 
circumstances, Anderson has clearly not met her burden of 
proving this jurisdictional issue. 
Moreover, even if this Court determined that Anderson 
created a fact issue regarding ASPRS' participation in drafting 
the consent form, this allegedly disputed fact is insufficient 
to establish jurisdiction. 
Under Utah law, only the relationship between a doctor and 
patient creates a duty on the part of a physician to disclose 
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3Notably, plaintiff presents this theory for the first t^me in 
her Appellate Brief and even then devotes only a single 
sentence in a footnote to establishing her theory. Anderson 
purports to rely on Salt Lake City School Dist. v. Galbraith & 
Green, Inc., 74 0 P.2d 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), however this 
case deals with equitable indemnity. Because Anderson failed 
to raise this issue in the trial court, she cannot assert it 
for the first time on appeal. See Insley Manufacturing Corp, 
v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986). 
Moreover, in the instant case, Anderson fails to indentify the 
contract or agreement to which she was not a party and which 
forms the basis for the alleged theory of third party 
beneficiary recovery. In fact, no such contract exists. 
Accordingly, there is no basis for assertion of in personam 
jurisdiction over ASPRS based on a third party beneficiary 
theory. See Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove v. Surety Insurance 
Co. of California, 703 P."2d 298 (Utah 1 985), 
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3. ASPRS did not contract to supply goods or 
services in Utah. 
Anderson's assertion that ASPRS contracted to supply 
services (Dr. Woolf) is completely without factual support. 
Anderson failed to identify or plead the existence of a 
contract for services and, in fact, there is no legally 
contractual relationship betwen ASPRS and Dr. Woolf. Dr. Woolf 
is a resident of Utah, licensed to practice medicine therein, 
and free to practice his specialty. 
ASPRS does not deny that, in its advisory capacity, it 
pre-screened the qualifications of potential clinical investi-
gators for approval by Dow Corning and the FDA. The 
pre-screening process, however, merely consisted of checking 
qualifications of investigators based on FDA articulated 
criteria. There is no dispute whether Dr. Woolf met the 
criteria set forth by the FDA for participation as an 
investigator. In any event, the final choice was under the 
control of Dow Corning and the FDA in all cases. Exhibit A of 
Anderson's brief states as follows: 
5. Selection of Treatment Team 
d. The FDA requires a complete curriculum vitae from 
every member of the Team for their evaluation and 
final approval. 
h. ISPAC (Injectable Silicone Program Advisory 
Committee) will select team. DCC (Dow Corning) 
reserves veto right. 
(Record at 1671.) 
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Additionally, Exhibit B of Anderson's brief states: 
4. g. Proposed list of ASPRS candidates will be 
assembled by silicone injection committee, 
but Dow Corning has the privilege of veto. 
(Record at 1678. ) 
Finally, Exhibit C of Anderson's brief states: 
III. Proposed Candidates for Participation in Service 
IND 
Drs. Musgrave and Elliott have prepared and submitted 
a list of 21 candidates with two more to be identified 
(Hawaii and Phoenix, Arizona). Rathjen (Dow Corning) 
has taken the list to review and will get back to 
Musgrave with Dow Coming's recommendations on accept-
ance. Dr. Musgrave will then contact candidates for 
their curriculum vitae. 
(Record at 1685.) 
There is no basis for Anderson's assertion that by screen-
ing potential investigators, pursuant to objective criteria, 
ASPRS "contracted to supply services in the state of Utah." 
Accordingly, this alleged activity by the ASPR does not give 
rise to :in personam jurisdiction under the Utah Long arm 
statute or the due process clause of the Constitution. 
4. The contacts of Dow Corning with the forum are 
not imputed to ASPRS. 
Plaintiff's final argument is that Dow and the ASPRS are 
joint venturers and therefore the contacts of Dow Corning are 
imputed to the ASPRS. In support of this proposition, 
Plaintiff cites Aigner v. Bell Helicopters, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 
532, 540 (N.D. 111. 1980). In Aigner, the court recited the 
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following as necessary elements for establishing the existence 
of a joint venture: 
1. A relationship based on a contract (express or 
implied). 
2. A community of interest in the purpose of the 
joint adventure. 
3. The right of the parties to direct and govern the 
conduct of each other. 
4. A proprietary interest in the subject matter. 
5. Expectation of profits. 
6. Sharing of profits. 
7. Sharing of losses. 
The Aigner Court conferred jurisdiction only after finding 
that "[t]he factual contentions set forth by the Plaintiffs 
. . . as supported by the evidentiary materials referred to 
therein . . .(were) sufficient to constitute at least a prima 
facie showing that each of the requisite joint venture elements 
was present in the . . . business relationship in question." 
Id. at 541. (Emphasis added). 
Anderson claims that a "fact issue" exists. The record 
does not support this claim. 
a) Dow and ASPRS did not have the right to 
direct and govern the conduct of each other. 
Dow authored the protocol and ASPRS had no control over 
it. Although ASPRS was consulted regarding some aspects of the 
study, Dow (and the FDA) at all times retained veto power over 
recommendations made. The evidence proffered by Anderson in 
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support of its allegations of ASPRS "control" are various 
minutes of meetings between ASPRS and Dow (Anderson's Exhibits 
A-C, attached to Anderson Brief).4 What is clear from 
Anderson's Exhibits is that ASPRS only acted as an advisor for 
some aspects of the Study. ASPRS did not control or 
participate in the investigations 
Exhibit B to Anderson's brief (minutes by Dow Corning) 
states as follows: 
Dow or Corning is the recognized sponsor and must 
answer to the FDA, will take the initiative if study 
protocol is violated or abused by individual 
investigators. 
(Record at 1677 and Anderson's Exhibit B, Section D(3)(d)(2).) 
Most importantly, the Application to the FDA regarding MDX 
4-4011 specifically list Dow Corning Corporation as the sole 
sponsor of the study. (Record at 1447-48) This fact further 
undermines Anderson's mischaracterization of ASPRS' advisory 
role. 
b) There is no actual or implied contract 
between ASPRS and Dow 
In alleging a joint venture, Anderson, in her brief, 
presumes the existence of a contract between Dow and ASPRS with 
4It is the position of ASPRS that the minutes relied on by 
Anderson do not qualify as competent evidence absent foundation 
testimony. ASPRS' reference to these Exhibits is not intended 
to constitute a waiver of its standing objection to Anderson's 
reliance on these documents. 
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regard to the protocol. This presumption is apparently based 
on sections of minutes and proposed minutes of certain meetings 
between Dow and ASPRS. (See Anderson's brief at Exhibits A -
C). These documents fail to establish any of the elements 
necessary for contract. 
Although it is not disputed that ASPRS rendered advice to 
Dow with regard to certain aspects of the protocol, this fact 
does not constitute a contract between the parties. Indeed, 
ASPRS received no consideration for its involvement. The 
activities of ASPRS are more accurately characterized as a 
public service. 
That the parties did not intend to be bound is further 
evidenced by Anderson's Exhibit "A" wherein it is stated "Dow 
Corning reserves the right to withdraw from the program if 
untoward expense is noted." (Record at 1669-73.) 
Moreover, it is not even alleged that the so-called implied 
contract between ASPRS and Dow contemplated expectation of pro-
fits nor sharing of profits and losses. Without these essen-
tial elements, there can be no finding of a joint venture. 
c) The Record is devoid of evidence that ASPRS 
had a proprietary interest in the subject 
matter, that it had an expectation of 
profits, or that it shared profits and 
losses with Dow. 
In Basset v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1,2 (Utah 1974), the Utah 
Supreme Court defined a joint venture as "an agreement between 
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two or more persons ordinarily, but not necessarily limited to 
a single transaction for the purpose of making a profit." 
(Emphasis added). It is undisputed that ASPRS did not intend 
to (and did not) make a profit as a result of its gratuitous 
advice. Indeed, ASPRS is a not-for-profit voluntary medical 
association. (Record at 1444.) Moreover, it is undisputed 
that ASPRS had no expectation of profit, and did not share 
profits or losses with Dow.5 Accordingly, on this basis 
alone, there is no issue as to whether ASPRS can be considered 
a joint venturer. 
The burden of establishing jurisdictional facts is on 
Anderson. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Philadelphia 
Resins, 766 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1985). She is not entitled to 
rely on mere allegations without proper evidentiary found-
ation. Thornock, 604 P.2d at 936. 
In this regard, Anderson has had ample opportunity to 
conduct discovery on the jurisdictional question and remains 
without any competent evidence to support her jurisdictional 
claim. Accordingly, ASPRS should be dismissed from this 
5Dow did not have an expectation of profit. Exhibit A to 
Anderson's brief (ASPRS minutes of 4/18/77) states: "...DCC 
(Dow Corning) would like to develop a program that would make 
the fluid available on a limited, non-profit basis for the 
treatment of a defined group of patients with severe defects 
where other therapeutic methods did not appear adequate." 
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lawsuit at this juncture. Saraceno v. S. C. Johnson & Son, 
Inc., 83 F.R.D. 65 (D.C. N.Y., 1979). 
POINT III 
ASSERTION OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER 
RESPONDENTS WOULD VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE 
PROCESS. 
In addition to satisfying the minimum contacts requirements 
of Utah's Long Arm Statute, the constitutional requirements of 
due process must also be satisfied before jurisdiction may be 
asserted over a non-resident defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Burt Drilling, 
Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 247 (Utah 1980). In Burt 
Drilling, this Court stated that: 
[a]fter determining that Section 78-27-24 . . . has 
been satisfied, the remaining question is whether it 
is consistent with our traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice to require defendant to 
defend this action in our courts. (Citations omitted.) 
Burt Drilling, 608 P.2d at 247. 
The United States Supreme Court stated that certain factors 
may be considered to determine whether the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction fails to comport with "fair play and 
substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). The factors listed by the Court 
included among others: a defendant's purposeful activity in 
the forum, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the 
dispute, the burdens on the defendant, and the shared interests 
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of the several states in furthering fundamental, substantive 
social policy. See also Burger King, 105 S. Ct. at 2184 and 
Worldwide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292. 
A. ASPRS And Dr. Goldwyn Did Not Engage In Purposeful 
Activities In Utah. 
The United States Supreme Court stresses "fair warning" and 
"foreseeability" as important factors in evaluating "minimum 
contacts" and determining "fair play and substantial justice." 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) 
(citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court of this State has also consistently held 
that in order for a nonresident defendant to become subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Utah courts, there must have been some 
intentional and purposeful activity of such defendant in the 
State of Utah by which he takes advantage of the benefit and 
protection of its laws, and is further obliged reciprocally to 
submit to its remedies. In Hanks v. Administrator of Estate of 
Jensen, 531 P.2d 363 (Utah 1974), while acknowledging that the 
Utah Long-arm Statute is applied to the fullest extent permit-
ted by the due process clause, this Court clarified that: 
It is nonetheless true that our courts cannot take 
jurisdiction over a resident of another state simply 
for the convenience or desire of the plaintiff. The 
rationale of statutes and the decisional law in the 
trend toward extending jurisdiction over foreign 
residents is that there must be some intentional and 
purposeful activity of the defendant in the forum 
state by which he takes advantage of the benefits and 
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protections of its laws, and is obliged reciprocally 
to submit to its remedies. (Emphasis added.) 
Hanks, 531 P.2d at 364. 
In the instant action, there is no purposefully established 
relationship between the respondents and this forum. Since the 
controversy cannot relate to activities in the forum state, 
significant contacts of a "continuous and systematic nature" 
must be asserted to support jurisdiction. Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); 
Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 578 P.2d 
850 (Utah, 1978). Respondents do not engage in any continuous 
or systematic activity in Utah. In fact, their contacts with 
Utah, if any, are so sporadic and so minimal, that it is in no 
way reasonable for them to anticipate being brought to court 
here. (Record at 1444-46 and 1466-67.) 
B. ASPRS And Dr. Goldwyn Could Not Reasonably Anticipate 
Being Haled Into Court In Utah. 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he due 
process clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not 
being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he 
has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties or relations.'" 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319. See 
also Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985). The United States Supreme Court also stated that "the 
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . . 
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is that the defendant's conduct in connection with the forum 
state [is] such that he should reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court there." Worldwide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
The only conceivable relationship between ASPRS and the 
State of Utah arises from the fact that out of approximately 
2,600 active members of the Society, 30 members reside in this 
State (Record at 1445 and Schedler Affidavit at 1f 7.) The 
controversy in this case does not stem from any activities 
relating to ASPRS membership. The presence of in-state member-
ship in an out-of-state organization is not a sufficient basis 
upon which to base an assertion of jurisdiction over the 
organization. Szabo v. Medical Information Bureau, 127 Cal. 
App.3d 51, 179 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1981); Elizabeth Hospital, Inc. 
v. Richardson, 167 F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Ark. 1958), aff'd, 269 
F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959). 
Indeed, co hold otherwise would be tantamount to finding 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation merely because it has 
shareholders who reside here. Case authority clearly forbids 
such a holding. See, e.g., Oostdyk v. British Airtours, Ltd., 
424 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
Dr. Goldwyn's only relationship and the State of Utah is an 
attenuated monitoring function and limited correspondence with 
Dr. Woolf arising out of either Anderson or her physician's 
unilateral acts. Exercise of Long-arm jurisdiction under these 
circumstances cannot comport with due process. Such attenuated 
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contacts with Utah have been consistently held insufficient for 
assertion of in personam jurisdiction. See Union Ski Co. v. 
Union Plastic's Corp., 548 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976); and Cate 
Rental Co. v. Whalen & Co., 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 1976). 
In summary, ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn have not purposefully 
engaged in any activity or conduct in this State and do not 
have sufficient contacts with the State of Utah to reasonably 
anticipate being haled into a Utah court under the Utah 
Long-arm Statute or applicable Utah law. 
C. Assertion Of Jurisdiction Over ASPRS And Dr. Goldwyn 
Would Violate Social Policy. 
There is an important public policy, favoring exchange and 
development of new medical technology and treatment. This 
public policy encourages widespread dissemination of techno-
logy, programs and medications in order to improve the health 
and welfare of our society. Many of the programs and studies 
that achieve these policy considerations are introduced into 
all or many of the United States. If those who participate on 
a limited basis in the furtherance of such programs are 
subjected to unlimited jurisdiction throughout the United 
States, it is inevitable that there will be a chilling effect 
on sharing medical advances. 
To avoid this undesirable result and give full force to the 
constitutional limitations on assertion of in personam juris-
diction, the lower court's determination that "[t]o assert in 
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personam jurisdiction over [ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn] under the 
circumstances of this case would constitute a violation of 
constitutional due process" must be affirmed. (Record at 1740.) 
Respondents' liberty interests in not being subject to the 
binding judgment of a forum with which they have established no 
meaningful contacts, ties, or relations would be severely 
violated in the instant case if a jurisdictional finding were 
made. It would also be unrealistic to suggest that respondents 
should reasonably anticipate being haled into Utah's courts 
when they have done nothing to avail themselves of the benefits 
and protections of Utah and have not engaged in any significant 
activity in Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Respondents submit that 
in personam jurisdiction in the State of Utah is lacking. 
Accordingly, ASPRS and Dr. Goldwyn respectfully requests this 
Court to affirm the lower court's Order of Dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
SCMLRL120 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483) 
LARRY R. LAYCOCK (A4 868) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Robert Goldwyn and American 
Society of Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgeons 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CELIA ANDERSON, 
-, • ^ .^ 4r ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADBENT & WOOLF, INC•, a 
Utah corporation, ROBERT M. WOOLF, 
individually, DOW CORNING 
CORPORATION, ROBERT GOLDWYN, 
an indivual, and THE 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLASTIC 
AND RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGEONS, 
Defendants. 
Defendants American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive 
Surgeons ("ASPRS") and Dr. Robert M. Goldwynfs Motions to Quash 
Service of Process and for Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint in 
the above-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing before 
the above-entitled court on September 25, 1987 in a special 
setting at the hour of 9:00 a.m.; Elliott J. Williams and 
*Z>L<£\UJ'ldLu ^ 
Case No. C-83-7367 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
A-l 
Larry R. Laycock of Snow, Christensen & Martineau appeared 
on behalf of defendants ASPRS and Robert M. Goldwyn, M.D. 
and Dan Bertch appeared on behalf of plaintiff Celia Anderson, 
and the court having heard oral argument, reviewed the pleadin 
and memoranda filed herein, and being fully apprised in the 
premises hereby finds: 
1. Defendant Robert M. Goldwyn, M.D., did not have 
contacts with the State of Utah or plaintiff sufficient to 
satisfy the minimum contacts requirement for assertion of 
in personam jurisdiction pursuant to the Utah Long-Arm Statute 
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (Supp. 1987)). 
2. To assert in. personam jurisdiction over Dr. Goldwyn 
under the circumstances of this case would constitute a 
violation of constitutional due process. 
3. Dr. Goldwyn1s motion for dismissal and to quash 
service of process should be granted on all of the grounds 
listed in the memoranda submitted by Dr. Goldwyn. 
4. Defendant ASPRS did not have contacts with the 
State of Utah or plaintiff sufficient to satisfy the minimum 
contacts requirement for assertion of j_n personam jurisdiction 
pursuant to the Utah Long-Arm Statute (Utah Code Ann, § 78-27-
(Supp. 1987)). 
5. To assert jln personam jurisdiction over ASPRS under 
the circumstances of this case would constitute a violation 
of constitutional due process. 
A-2 
6. ASPRS1 motion for dismissal and to quash service 
of process should be granted on all of the grounds cited in 
the memorada submitted by ASPRS. 
7. The court finds that there is no just reason for 
delay and entry of judgment should be expressly directed 
as provided in Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BASED UPON THE FOREGOING AND GOOD CAUSE 
APPEARING THEREFOR, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendants ASPRS and Dr. Robert M. Goldwyn's motions 
for dismissal and to quash service of process be and the same 
are hereby granted and the plaintiff's claims against said 
defendants are dismissed and service of process upon them is 
quashed for the reason the courts of the State of Utah lack 
personal jurisdiction over them. 
2. There is no just reason for delay and entry of 
this Order as a final judgment is hereby expressly directed 
pursuant to Rule 54(b),.Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this / 7 day of October, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
vLe<pnard H. Russdl 
S t r i c t Court Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DiXQWH'Ht" " . ' 
c : .-
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• s s • 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SKAUNA JENSEN, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys 
* „ Defendants ASPRS and Robert M. Goldwyn, M.D. , _ _ ^ v_ 
tor herein, tna: 
she served the attached Order of Dismissal (unsigned) 
(Case No.) C-83-7367 ^Qn t h e _ r. 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a: 
envelope addressed to; 
Dan Bertch, Esq. 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 501 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
P. Keith Nelson, Esq. 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
50 South Main Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Ray R. Christensen, Esq. 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell 
510 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 7th day of October , 1987. 
SHAUNA JENSEN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7th £ay 
of October , 1937. 
My Commission Expires 
ADDENDUM "B" 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS (A3483) 
LARRY R. LAYCOCK (A4 868) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Robert Goldwyn and American 
Society of Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgeons 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CELIA ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BROADBENT & WOOLF, INC., a 
Utah corporation, ROBERT M. 
WOOLF, individually, DOW 
CORNING CORPORATION, ROBERT 
GOLDWYN, an individual, and 
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
PLASTIC AND RECONSTRUCTIVE 
SURGEONS, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
DR. ROBERT M. GOLDWYN, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states the following upon his own personal 
knowledge and information: 
"J 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. 
GOLDWYN, M.D. 
Case No. C 8 3 - 7 3 6 7 
Judge Leonard H. Russon 
B - l 
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I am a resident of Brookline, Massachusetts, and am over 21 
years of age. 
2. I am a medical doctor specializing in plastic and 
reconstructive surgery and am licensed to practice medicine in 
the State of Massachusetts. I am in private medical practice 
in Brookline, Massachusetts. 
3. Although I am a member of the American Society of 
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc. ("Society"), I am not 
employed as a medical doctor for the Society. I have never 
performed any medical service or treatment whatsoever on behalf 
of the Society in Utah or anywhere else. 
4. I am not an agent, employee or representative of Dow 
Corning Corporation. I have never performed any medical 
treatment or service for Dow Corning Corporation in Utah or 
anywhere else. 
5. I am not presently and never have been licensed to 
practice medicine in Utah. I have never advertised, maintained 
an office or otherwise transacted any business in the State of 
Utah. Further, I do not own, use or possess any real property 
situated in Utah. 
6. I was appointed medical monitor for the MDX4-4011 
Silicone Injection Study by agreement with the Federal Drug 
Administration and the Society for the purpose of screening 
potential patients for the said Silicone Injection Study. 
B-2 
Medical information for Celia Anderson was forwarded to 
Massachusetts from her physician for the purpose of obtaining 
my approval for Celia Anderson's voluntary entry into the 
Silicone Injection Study. Based on the information I received 
from Celia Anderson's physician, I approved her entry into the 
Silicone Injection Study. 
7. My role in Celia Anderson's entry in the Silicone 
Injection Study was limited to review of medical information 
provided by her physician. That review was conducted in 
Massachusetts. I have never seen or communicated with Celia 
Anderson. 
DATED this day of July, 1987. 
Dr. Robert Goldwyn 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of July, 
1987. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at:__ 
My Commission Expires: 
SCMLRL54 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
STATE OF ILLINOIS ) 
) SS. : 
COUNTY OF COOK ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS R. SCHEDLER 
Thomas R. Schedler, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and states: 
1. I am the Executive Director of the American Society of 
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc. ("ASPRS"). 
2. ASPRS was founded in 1931, and is incorporated under 
the not-for-profit corporation laws of the State of Illinois. 
ASPRS has its headquarters and principal place of business in 
Chicago, Illinois. ASPRS is exempt from federal income taxation 
under Section 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
3. ASPRS has no office or employee in the State of Utah. 
ASPRS is not qualified to do business in the State of Utah, has 
not designated an agent for acceptance of service of process in 
Utah, has not contracted to supply services or goods in Utah, and 
has no telephone listing or bank account in Utah. ASPRS does not 
own, use or possess any real estate in Utah. 
4. ASPRS does not practice medicine or manufacture, sell 
or distribute MDX 4-4011 or any drug or device in Utah or any 
state, and did not draft, prepare or distribute the consent form 
in issue. 
5. ASPRS is a voluntary association comprising 
approximately 2,600 active members, who are practicing plastic 
surgeons in the United States and Canada. 
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6. The ASPRS membership meets once a year. The ASPRS 
annual meeting is held in various cities. The ASPRS annual 
meeting has never been held in the State of Utah. 
7. Approximately 30 active ASPRS members reside in the 
State of Utah. 
8. As part of my duties as ASPRS Executive Director, I 
attend meetings of various medical societies, public interest 
groups or government agencies throughout the United States. I 
have never represented ASPRS at a function in the State of Utah. 
For at least the past ten years, ASPRS has never been represented 
at a function in the State of Utah. 
9. For at least the past ten years, ASPRS has conducted no 
educational symposia or seminars in the State of Utah. 
10. ASPRS does not license, certify or accredit physicians 
or hospitals. Membership in ASPRS is not a prerequisite to the 
practice of medicine or surgery in any state. 
11. ASPRS does not solicit applications for membership, but 
accepts applications from qualified physicians who are sponsored 
for membership by two ASPRS active members. 
12. Applications for membership in ASPRS are submitted to 
the ASPRS office in Chicago, Illinois. When the membership file 
in Chicago is complete, including letters of reference and other 
supporting information, the application is reviewed in Chicago by 
the ASPRS Membership Committee. Favorable recommendations by the 
Membership Committee are presented to the ASPRS Board of 
Directors. If an application is approved by the Board, the 
C-2 
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applicant's name is submitted to the assembled membership at the 
ASPRS annual meeting, and a favorable vote of 80% of those 
present and voting is required to admit an applicant to 
membership in ASPRS. 
13. All membership dues are billed from and paid to the 
ASPRS office in Chicago, Illinois. In 1986, estimated total dues 
collected from all ASPRS members was $lf300,000. Estimated dues 
collected during 1986 from active members residing in Utah were 
$14,500. 
14. ASPRS is governed by a 21-member Board of Directors. 
No directors reside in Utah. 
15. My personal domicile and residence are in the State of 
Illinois. 
Further Affiant saith not. 
Thomas R< Schedler 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
before me this V% day 
of v]j«^y 1987 
Notary Public 
My Commission exp i res frAv<6i# \1k Hffl 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the 14th day of April, 
1988, I cause four (4) true and correct copies of the 
Brief of Respondents ASPRS and Dr. Robert Goldwyn to be 
served upon the following: 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Robert J. DeBry 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
Attorneys for Appellant 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
P. Keith Nelson 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Attorneys for Broadbent & Woolf 
and Dr. Woolf 
50 South Main Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Ray R. Christensen 
Christensen, Jensen & Powell 
Attorneys for Dow Corning Corporation 
510 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
